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Complimentary or Conflicting Freedoms? Why Religious Freedom, Reproductive
Freedom, and LGBT Rights Can Coexist and Thrive
Recent events in a number of states, along with the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Obergefell v. Hodges, have resulted in a national debate often pitting religious freedom against the
civil rights and civil liberties of the LGBT community. This controversy follows closely on the
heels of the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, which set off a firestorm over
the balance between reproductive rights and religious freedom. The framing of these supposed
conflicts by the media and by some legal scholars ignores one central fact: religious freedom and
strong civil rights and civil liberties for all can coexist when properly understood. The key is
understanding the parameters of the rights involved on both sides, the fact that they do not conflict
in the vast majority of religious freedom cases, and to work towards a legal framework that helps
us navigate the situations where genuine conflicts do exist. This article will first explain that most
religious freedom claims, such as a request by a Muslim or Jewish employee to be able to have a
short break to pray quietly at certain times during the day while at work, do not conflict with the
rights of third parties. Next, it will turn to those situations where religious freedom claims have
conflicted with the rights of others. Prior to Hobby Lobby it was generally understood that such
claims would not be successful, but Hobby Lobby has seriously muddied the waters on this issue.
This article will focus on government employees, such as county clerks who deny marriage
licenses to same-sex couples, and explain when accommodation may be appropriate and when it
is not. The article suggests that when someone else in the office can grant the marriage license
without inconveniencing those seeking the license there may be grounds for a religious exemption,
but where the person seeking the exemption is the only one who can grant the license no
accommodation should be forthcoming. The article also explains why this is consistent both with
Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, RFRA, and the fundamental nature of the right to religious
freedom.
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This article will discuss the implications of the Supreme Court's decision on same-sex
marriage (SSM) on debates over accommodating the religious freedom of individuals and entities

who oppose SSM and same-sex relations on religious grounds. Justice Alito and Thomas assert
that the Obergefell, by obviating the need or possibility for state-by-state legislative/political
resolution of SSM, will have negative consequences for the religious freedom of individuals and
groups who oppose SSM. I propose to analyze and evaluate this claim. At a minimum, they refer
to the fact that in some states political/legislative deals tied recognition of SSM "to protection for
conscience rights." I will look at such laws to see how they did this, and if these were thought to
adequately protect religious objectors to SSM.
My main claim is that the dissenters' complaint is an assumption about the actual workings
of the political process that religious objectors to SSM were successfully or adequately using their
power (veto power) over legal recognition of SSM to negotiate carve-outs for themselves in a
regime that recognized SSM. It is also a moral claim -- that it is appropriate to give religious
people a trump over recognition of SSM as a bargaining chip to negotiate carve outs. If you
believe, as I do, that the harm to same-sex couples and their children is immediate and serious,
whereas the harm to religious objectors to SSM is largely speculative and diffuse, then it is wrong
to give religious objectors a veto right.
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This paper examines line drawing between protected and unprotected speech, with a focus
on the distinction between provocation and incitement to imminent violence. Specifically, it looks
at the French government’s response to the January 7th Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris and
measures the French free speech standard against international law.
The French government’s response was, on the one hand, zealously in favor of free speech,
with social media saturated with the hashtag #JeSuisCharlie, or #IAmCharlie. On the other hand,
the government also commenced “aggressive enforcements” of Law No. 2014-1353 of November
13, 2014, an anti-terrorism law that was rarely used until the weeks pursuant to the attack, against
anyone who spoke out against the Charlie Hebdo cause. Among those prosecuted for their speech
was Dieudonné M’Bala M’Bala, a French comedian, who was arrested for “defending terrorism”
in a Facebook status that read, “Tonight, as far as I’m concerned, I feel like Charlie Coulibaly.”
The statement was a combination of the slogan “Je suis Charlie” (“I am Charlie”) and Amedy
Coulibaly, the name of the gunman who terrorized the kosher supermarket, and appeared to imply
sympathy with the terrorists. M’Bala was fined $37,000.
Various commentators and scholars have pointed out the double standard in the French
government’s treatment of speech, especially in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attack. Jonathan
Turley reflected in the Washington Post about the spontaneous rally in support of Charlie Hebdo
after the attack: “[O]ne could fairly ask what they were rallying around. The greatest threat to
liberty in France has come not from the terrorists who committed such horrific acts this past week

but from the French themselves, who have been leading the Western world in a crackdown on free
speech.”
Indeed, the French government has a history of using its speech laws to curtail the speech
of journalists, comedians, celebrities, and ordinary citizens alike. At the core of the French double
standard is its inconsistent distinction between protection and punishment of provocative speech.
In Part I, this paper will look at how provocation is treated in international law, in particular,
Articles 19-20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Then, Part II
will look at the ways French speech law is inconsistent with these international standards due to
its inherent vagueness and consequent potential for abuse. The paper will conclude by advocating
for a more uniform, more protective approach to speech—one that will bring French law into
conformity with international law.
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Sonic Jihad: Muslim Hip Hop in the Age of Mass Incarceration
This essay explores legal criticism at the intersection of prisons, Islam, and hip hop culture.
It argues that for Muslims in America, hip hop culture has functioned as a megaphone for voicing
a long list of radical critiques of the criminal justice system–including unfair laws, law
enforcement, and courts. Among the troubles that have afflicted the hip hop generation and its
offspring, perhaps nothing compares to the effects of losing friends, family, and loved ones to the
system of mass imprisonment.
As the phrase “down by law” indicates, criticism of the law has been a part of hip hop
culture from the earliest days, which invariably involves the blasting of prisons. The attacks are
launched at multiple levels, against an institution known in the lyrics by a host of names like “pen,”
“bing,” and “clink.” Sometimes the “belly of the beast” is vilified in a lyrical twist or in the title
of a song, other times entire songs or albums are dedicated to telling the horrors of imprisonment
and stories of solitary confinement, while more extreme depictions redefine fantasy fiction through
apocalyptic visions of revolution and revenge. Within this cosmic view, prisons are but an
extension of the slave system that first brought African Muslims to America as chattel. The music
embodies the hardest edges of sound, stacked with heavy beats and lyrics that decry the new
slavery.
The following offers a candid view of this full-blown discursive war, which challenges the
view that the most radical voices in Muslim America are to be found in mosques and other Muslim
gatherings. This view must contend with the sonic jihad launched by Muslim rappers. Their war
of words is discourse in the extreme that rivals the rhetoric of any jihadist organization.

